General Walker: Defamed Patriot and War Hero

General Walker Oversaw the Integration of the Public Schools in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Edwin Anderson Walker was born on Nov. 10, 1909, in Center Point, Tex. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1931.

During World War II, the then Colonel Walker commanded a special operations force comprised of Americans and Canadians in the Aleutian Islands, Italy and France. This unit, known as the Special Service Force, was trained for airborne, amphibious, mountain and ski operations; it fought and secured the bloody Anzio beachhead in Italy and played a key role in the Normandy Invasion of occupied France. A movie about this, the most elite of the allied elite units, was made starring actor Cliff Robertson. He later commanded the 417th Infantry Regiment, attached to the Third Army, and at V-E Day he was commanding a special task unit in Oslo.

During the Korean War, he commanded the Third Infantry Division’s Seventh Regiment with distinction in some of the war’s fiercest engagements and was senior adviser to the First Korean Corps. He later served as military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist China. In 1957, as commander of the Arkansas military district, General Walker led the troops ordered to Little Rock by President Dwight D. Eisenhower to quell disturbances resulting from the integration of public schools there.

By this time Walker had established himself as one of our military’s most gifted and accomplished officers. His career seemed on a fast track to four stars and even appointment to the Joint Chiefs. It should be noted that had General Walker not resigned from the Army in 1961, he might have very well ended up appointed as the U.S. Forces Commander during the Viet Name War. But alas, it was not to be.

 In 1959, General Walker’s stellar career led him to a command of the famous 24th Infantry Division, then stationed in Germany.  The Division was a crucial force in the defense of Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact Forces.  It was an assignment indicative of someone who was expected to rise to the upper most echelons of the U.S. Army.

General Walker’s command of the 24th Division was praised by senior leaders throughout the Army. By early 1961 his term as the Division’s commander was nearly over and Walker was about to receive promotion to Lieutenant General when his fortunes seemed to change in an instant.

In that year, several months after the inauguration of President Kennedy, signs of tension between the Kennedy administration and the Pentagon began to surface. The Kennedy administration did not trust the military and feared public embarrassment over the consensus among military leaders that Kennedy lacked any firm commitment in the world wide struggle against Communism. The failure of Kennedy to authorize the requested air support during the Bay of Pigs invasion was the lynchpin of the operation’s failure for which Kennedy took sole responsibility. In short, the nation’s military establishment believed Kennedy was in “over his head” and his appointment of leftist ideologues to the Defense Department further alienated the brass.

Lacking the public support to challenge the Joint Chiefs directly, Kennedy and his people were looking for someone to make an example of in hopes of keeping the military in check.

They found what they were looking for when an obscure overseas newspaper, which was circulated among the G.I.s stationed in Europe, and billed as the Leftist alternative to The Stars and Stripes, published libelous and unsubstantiated charges that General Walker had made unflattering comments about certain prominent American liberals and further that he was “indoctrinating” his soldiers with material from the rightist John Birch Society. In fact, both charges, which Walker had vehemently denied all along, were later proved to be completely false by the official government inquiry into the matter.  Unfortunately, not before Walker was summarily relieved of his command by liberal academic turned Kennedy Secretary of the Army Elvis Stahr. A purge of other lower level “anti-communist” flag officers followed.

This resulted in considerable outrage among millions of veterans in America. Having been publically humiliated, General Walker chose to resign rather than subject himself to further character assassination.

 Upon returning to his home state of Texas, General Walker was welcomed to Dallas by the Mayor and over a thousand of the city’s most prominent citizens.  A video of this event is embedded above showing General Walker receiving an award from the Mayor of Dallas.  Soon thereafter, General Walker began to speak out as a private citizen often lambasting the Kennedy administration over its shiftless foreign policy and political correctness.  In fact, the Case of General Walker and those who followed him mark the first real appearance of a leftist political correctness from any level of government.

General Walker began attracting large crowds to his speeches while Kennedy’s popularity in the Southern and Western states began to wane.  Walker’s image was placed on the cover of Time magazine and the clarion call he was sounding to America was quickly gaining an ever widening audience.

In the State of Mississippi, after making a public statement with the state’s Governor, a riot erupted on the campus of the University of Mississippi in protest of the federal government’s forced integration of the college. At one point during the clash with federal authorities, General Walker climbed a statute on the campus and made a public and forceful plea for the violence to stop and for the protestors to return home.

Despite this, then Attorney General Robert Kennedy indicted General Walker, his brother’s political nemesis, on charges of inciting a riot. The charges never even got past the grand jury and were dismissed as baseless. Yet before this, the Kennedys had Walker committed to a Federal Insane Asylum to discredit him publically. This unwarranted and politically motivated action shocked many in the psychiatric medicine community at the time especially as it was a common ploy of the communist leadership in the former Soviet Union to place political dissidents in mental hospitals.

General Walker’s reputation and career were perhaps the first in a long succession of those of other military officers to be sacrificed on the altar of political correctness.  Many more would follow and will continue to do so until the patriots of this country take their land and culture back.

Edwin Walker’s decorations included the Silver Star, the Bronze Star with cluster and the Legion of Merit, as well as honors from France, Britain, Norway and South Korea.

 

Communist Plans to Invade Western Europe During Comrade Gorbachev’s Perestroika.

It’s been some twenty years since the collapse of Eastern Europe’s Communist regimes. Historians are still pouring through the billions of pages of documents and files kept by these totalitarian regimes during the cold war. What shocking things we have learned about the diabolical secret policies and practices of the Communists governments of the former Soviet Union and their Warsaw Pact puppet states. Perhaps most frightening, is the discovery of the well-documented and admitted plans for the invasion of western Europe which were pushed by the Soviet military and political hardliners virtually right up until the fall of the Berlin wall.   The following paper is bone chilling!

 By Dr. Michael M. Boll

This article was researched and written for publication in the U.S. Army War College’s publication, Parameters.

On 13 May Î990, the Soviet Ambassador to West Germany, Yuli Kvitsinsky, left Bonn for Moscow to receive instructions on how to handle the growing drive for German unification. The four powers with residual rights in Germany as a result of their victory in World War II had just ended their first meeting on that topic, and Kvitsinsky realized that the Soviet government had yet to work out its own approach to this burning issue. “The existence of the DDR [or GDR, German Democratic Republic] was only a question of months, and we faced the choice in the time remaining whether to engage actively in the solution of the issue or to simply accept what those in the West would create without our contribution.”1

 Although Kvitsinsky’s boss, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, had realized as early as 1986 that “in the near future the German question would define Europe,” Kvitsinsky found little support for a diplomatic solution outside his own ministry.2 “It was disturbing that . . . many deputies of the Supreme Soviet did not wish to accept the developments, that a massive attack against the foreign minister appeared in the press, and we were overwhelmed with criticisms from other government departments, especially from the military.”3

 Apparently unknown to the Soviet Ambassador were the far-reaching plans drafted decades earlier by Communist leaders for an alternative, more “favorable,” and most bloody solution to the “German question.” These plans called for a rapid military strike across the German plains to the Atlantic if and when possible. The plans were premised upon the retention of East Germany within the Warsaw Pact and the use of East German territory as the key staging area for a massive nuclear and conventional attack. Eleven well-trained East German divisions (five of which were unknown to the West) were assigned to the attack. Their mission entailed offensive action followed by unification of West and East Germany under a common Communist regime. These well-developed plans help to explain why the hopes of Kvitsinsky and Shevardnadze for a diplomatic solution met such strong resistance.

 The details of the extensive Warsaw Pact offensive plans, designed to destroy NATO forces in West Germany and, if possible, effect total domination of Western Europe, now are emerging from documents found in East German files following peaceful reunification in 1990″. Despite the destruction of many papers in the archives of the East German army, some 25,000 files remain, containing more than 500,000 classified documents. When combined with interviews of former East German officers, these sources “show unambiguously how, through political decisions made by the highest officials, the forces of the former

Eastern Bloc were so organized that a sole option was given for an offensive and how, through regular exercises, [this plan] was refined.”4 Equally disturbing,

 Pact exercises of this basic offensive doctrine, complete with the simulated use of nuclear weapons, continued until 1990—long after Gorbachev had pledged to restrict Soviet doctrine to one based upon “Defensive Sufficiency,” and three years after the Warsaw Pact’s formal renunciation of offensive plans.

 The Planned Attack

 In 1992, a year after the demise of the Warsaw Pact, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev provided his own confirmation of the detailed planning which supported the offensive nature of this former military alliance. As we  know, there used to be the Warsaw Pact, and it provided the basis for creating the first and foremost strategic line, a springboard for further offensive operations. This line ran along the borders of the GDR.

 The breach of subsequent defense lines required only a threefold superiority. It is obvious that in preparation for the performance of such tasks, there should have been a concentration of the appropriate troops, not just “large in numbers” but also excellently drilled and perfectly trained. Elite troops, to put it briefly, indeed, such elite troops were actually concentrated along the main strategic line,’

 The East German documents and extensive interviews reveal that Warsaw Pact forces planned a massive offensive through West Germany along five different axes, with a sixth possible under certain conditions.6  It must be emphasized that these were not merely contingency plans—the kind which most military establishments prepare to cover possible outbreaks of conflict. Pact offensive plans had the participating units already assigned, the goals specified, and the potential nuclear targets identified. AH that was required for execution was last-minute updates and mobilization of the required units.

 The East German army was to play a major role in attacks on four of the six axes. It was expected to mobilize 11 divisions^ 2500 artillery systems, 2300 main battle tanks, and more than 5000 armored fighting vehicles. Six of the East German divisions were capable of achieving full combat readiness within 24 hours, in part the result of strict military regulations which required that between 70 and 80 percent of all army personnel be physically present in garrisons at all times. The remaining five East German divisions would be ready for battle within one week.7

 The mobilized East German forces possessed munitions adequate for 90 days of combat with a 100-percent redundancy. Once the borders of West Germany had been cleared of enemy troops; the East German units would begin occupation duties in the long-coveted reunited fatherland.8

  At that moment, a central goal of the East German regime would be realized. Other Pact troops, however, would continue their drive westward. Among the main objectives, as East German Defense Minister Heinz Hoffman reported to his National Defense Council, was “to reach the Bay of Biscay and the Spanish border on the thirtieth and thirty-fifth day.”9

 Axis One of the grand offensive consisted of a two-pronged thrust along the Baltic Coast in the direction of Jutland, with the objective of conquering the northwestern German region of Schleswig-Holstein, establishing control of the Baltic Sea, and seizing existing NATO air bases for use in subsequent operations. The designated objectives were to be attained within 100 hours after the outbreak of hostilities. Three East German, one Soviet, and one Polish division, accompanied by various support units, would bear the brunt of the fighting.

 Lothar Ruehl, former head of the West German Ministry of Defense Planning Staff, noted perceptively that such a stringent deadline for reaching the contested objective—100 hours—implies extraordinary effort and the rapid destruction of NATO forces positioned to block such an offensive: “Staff officers of the Bundeswehr who are familiar with Warsaw Pact operational planning maintain that it would have been difficult to conduct an . . .offensive such as this . . . [and that] in order to be successful, the Warsaw Pact would have needed much larger forces and it would have had to use chemical and nuclear arms at an early stage of the campaign.”10 East German documents reveal that between 78 and 90 tactical nuclear weapons with warheads ranging from three to 100 kilotons were available to support the East German troops.

 Delivery systems included SS-21 and Scud B missiles as well as a number of nuclear-capable Soviet aircraft. First and follow-on use of such weapons was planned, with targets already selected deep in NATO’s corps areas.  Unfortunately, no information has yet been discovered to shed light on the precise political decision making process involved in the final authorization for nuclear strikes. It is assumed that the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party would make the basic decision to use nuclear weapons.” Such crucial decisions would hardly be delegated to East German authorities.  East German forces also were assigned prominent roles in the three axes to the south of the Jutland offensive. Axis Two encompassed the northern section of West Germany in the area of Bremen and Hamburg, continuing on into the Netherlands. Axis Three proceeded from the East German region of Magdeburg toward Hannover and Braunschweig, into the Ruhr and further into Belgium. Axis Four traversed the famous Fulda Gap toward Frankfurt am Main and on to the Rhine, with possible expansion into the French regions near Reims and Metz.

 In addition to these planned assaults, a fifth route of advance would take Pact forces without East German participation through Bavaria an BadenrWuerttemberg, over the Rhine, and into France. A sixth route, apparently not fully worked out, would take Pact forces through neutral Austria and Switzerland (Lake Constance, Basel) into France in the area of Besançon. A follow-on stage of the southern two axes, operating without East German forces, would take Pact forces into the interior of France in an effort to destroy suspected NATO reserves, with the Bay of Biscay and the Spanish border representing the limits of advance.12

 Occupation

 The conquest of West Germany would be the signal for East German forces to commence their occupation of the conquered land, a goal for which detailed plans had long been made. East German intentions concerning West Berlin provide an example of the meticulous attention to detail in East German plans for the occupation.

 West Berlin was divided into two sectors for the initial assault, withdesignated East German units assigned to take the western area (District One), and to provide assistance to Soviet forces engaged in District Two. Approximately 32,000 Pact forces and East German policemen would confront 12,000 NATO soldiers and 6000 West Berlin police.

Early in the conflict, Tempelhof and Tegel airports would be taken by parachutists. Allied casernes and strongholds, including the Allied Kommandantur on Kaiserswerther Strasse, the US Mission on Clayallee, and the Turner caserne, were to be seized and turned over to the invading Pact forces for their use.13 Details for the ensuing administration of West Berlin, drafted as earlyas 1985 and signed by the head of the East German district administration (Bezirksverwaltung), Lieutenant-General Schwanitz, provided a key role for East German security forces.

 The initial task was to seize and intern “enemy forces,” which in this context meant leading politicians, bureaucrats, and well-known economists, scientists, and technology specialists. The list also included individuals particularly odious to the East German authorities, such as secret agents employed by the West German military, leaders of disliked organizations, and journalists who had been critical of the East German state. “The most significant enemy centers,” were to be occupied and secured, with General Schwanitz confirming a list of some 170 installations originally identified in a 1978 document. The objectives mentioned just in the district of Kreuzberg give an indication of the East German thoroughness. Here, the police weapons depot, the main Customs Bureau, the Customs Investigator Bureau (Zollfahndungsamt), the State Printing Shop, the Telecommunications Bureau, the Artisans’ Chamber of Commerce (Handwerk-skammer), and the sewage treatment plant were to be immediately taken.

 The 12 existing West Berlin Districts were to be controlled through the institution of District Administrative Centers (Kreisdienststellen), long in use in East Berlin. Each center was assigned 40 to 47 high-ranking officials who would direct activities in the reunited sections of Berlin. These, in turn, were subordinated to a Command Group complete with 80 appointed officials.  Four areas of responsibility within the Command Group corresponded to identical bureaus within the East German secret police, and were to be responsible for counterespionage, security of ministerial organs, security in the economy, and security of transportation. The fifth of these “Operative Groups” had a more general task: It was to combat “political-ideological diversions” and “underground activities.” Based upon the organization of a similar East German department, it would form a network of secret agents capable of supervising every activity of the conquered population.

 The organizational plans for the occupied city, in which many of the positions already carried the name of the intended office-holder, aimed both at creating Communist rule as soon as possible and defeating any resistance which the local citizens might attempt. Until such anticipated civilian resistance was crushed, the Berlin Wall would remain in place, and security forces in both East and West Berlin would stand at the ready. When this threat had passed, the long-sought unification would be complete.

 As another unambiguous sign of its determination to integrate West Berlin into the East German economy, the communist government, as early as 1980, printed and stored for future use 4.9 billion marks in occupation currency to be introduced immediately upon termination of the fighting. In Î985, 8000 special military medals to be awarded for bravery (Tapferkeit) to the victorious East German units were struck and stored in a special “medals-cellar” awaiting the day of decision.1,1

 Given the attention to detail included in plans for the occupation of West Berlin, one suspects that equally painstaking efforts were made for the assimilation of the Federal Republic as a whole. With the well-known communist penchant for large, centralized structures of administration, it seems

 In 1985, 8000 special military medals to be  awarded for bravery to the victorious East German units were struck and stored…

awaiting the day of decision. “

 unlikely that the federated forms of rule characteristic of West Germany would have remained as we knew them. Perhaps one or more “supra” German provinces would emerge, similar in size to Prussia in the prewar period of German history. Unfortunately, such plans, if indeed they escaped the shredders’ efforts, haven’t yet been released to the public.

 Diplomacy and the Nuclear Question

 The evidence already available supports the conclusion that an alternative plan for German unification and in propitious circumstances, the conquest of Western Europe—existed at the very moment the Gorbachev government was negotiating a peaceful solution to the so called “German Issue.” The painstaking care andcompleteness of the Pact’s alternate plan, however, raises two issues which require further analysis.

First, the exact decision making process for approving the use of nuclear weapons by Pact forces hasn’t been found among the many files already examined. What, therefore, leads Western analysts familiar with the documents to conclude that nuclear war was intrinsic to Pact plans? And second, how is it possible—three full years after the Warsaw Pact officially announced it was moving to Defensive Sufficiency as the basis of its military strategy—that such clearly offensive plans as detailed above continued to form the basis of Pact thinking? Curiously, these two issues may be closely related.

 The grounds for concluding that Pact forces would indeed have received permission to employ nuclear weapons from the beginning of their offensive lie in the numerous war games practiced by the Warsaw Pact and followed closely by NATO observers.  As the former German Federal Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg concluded in a 1992 press conference: The employment of tactical atomic weapons was an integral component in the[military] exercises of the [Warsaw Pact] at the Army Command-level [Fuehrungsebene Armee] and higher. In the conceptions of the military command, their [nuclear weapons’] employment should above all serve the goal of breaking through the opposing defenses. Examples were the 1979 Staff Exercise “Attack of the Front with or without Nuclear Weapons,” or the 1981 Command Staff Exercise of the Front “Soiuz 81” with the exercise goal of “Command of the strategic offensive operation with the use of nuclear weapons,” led by the then commander of the [Warsaw Pact], Marshal Kulikov.15

 In 1980, a Pact exercise entitled “Weapon-Brotherhood” {Wqffen-bruederschaß) provided detailed insight into Pact nuclear plans. The East German, Soviet, and Polish army commanders were required to decide upon the employment of nuclear weapons. The decision was conveyed to the East German Defense Minister since East Germany had specific responsibility for conducting this particular exercise. As a result of a positive decision, the first echelon of the participating troops were issued 20 Scud missiles, 55 FROGs, and ten nuclear bombs. In addition, the air forces of the Front were allotted 125 nuclear bombs while the rocket brigades received 60 Scuds and 50 FROGs. The targets for the offensive employment of these nuclear forces included NATO nuclear storage depots, installations housing NATO air forces and air defenses, division headquarters and their communications networks, troops, and fleet command centers of the West German navy. In reserve stood four air divisions equipped with nuclear weapons as well as other nuclear reserves.16

The planned use of nuclear weapons promised such devastation that Warsaw Pact Commander Marshal Kulikov noted at the conclusion of the 1983 Pact exercise Soiuz 83: “This war will be carried on to the complete destruction of the enemy and without compromise. This war forces us to use our entire arsenal irrespective of the uncontrollable results of strategic actions.”17 

In the mid-1980s, Pact exercises appeared to forego nuclear operations, but in 1988 such activities once again dominated Pact training. In the1989 staff exercise, the nuclear devastation of the West German region of Schleswig-Holstein was practiced through the simulated use of 76 nuclear weapons. Two final exercises by the East German forces utilizing nuclear weapons occurred in 1990, after the Berlin Wall ceased to divide the city. In June of that year, following the democratic election of the

De Maiziere government, Soviet and East German forces conducted a simulated nuclear attack upon NATO forces.’8 The following year the Warsaw Pact dissolved, ending once and for all plans for the conquest of West Germany. The continuation of Pact exercises with simulated use of nuclear weapons stands in sharp contrast to the extensive Pact promises of reorienting their military doctrine to one emphasizing defensive preparation. At its May

1987 Berlin meeting, the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee proclaimed that “a world war, especially a nuclear one, would have catastrophic consequences not only for states directly drawn into the conflict but even for life itself on earth.”19  As Andrei Kokoshin, then Deputy Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, and subsequently Russian First Deputy Minister of Defense, explained in 1988, the importance of the Warsaw Pact’s new military doctrine lay in the impermissibility of both nuclear and conventional war [The doctrine] is directed not to preparations for war but against war, towards strengthening the structure of international security. Earlier military activities of the Warsaw Pact revolved around the defensive practices of war; but now this problem has been moved to first place in the doctrine, it has become primary and defining.20

By the following year, Soviet theoreticians were proclaiming that Defensive Sufficiency [Oboronnaia dostatochnost’]—the most important element of [the] military doctrine of socialism, functions as the essential foundation of all its military construction, presupposing, in the first instance, a refusal to be first to begin military activities; maintenance of the military-strategic balance at levels as low as possible; mutual reduction of arms to such a point that neither side has the physical possibility to undertake an attack; bringing the structure of the armed forces, their equipment, and their location into line with defensive tasks; and undertaking strict control over the reduction of military forces and likewise over military activities.

 Were these strident, insistent proclamations by Pact leaders and Soviet theoreticians of their, new defensive orientation simply efforts to deceive Western observers? This seems unlikely; NATO intelligence continued to monitor Pact exercises, noting, as mentioned above, the simulated use of nuclear weapons well into Î990.22 Certainly it is possible, although unlikely, that Pact commanders were involved in a massive deception of their own political leaders, reflective of a distaste for Gorbachev’s policies which surfaced more clearly in the August 1991 attempted coup. But it is more likely that the Pact’s announced defensive position was more in the realm of intent—more attuned to a desirable posture one day attainable, than to an immediate reform, interestingly, the Soviet articles which describe the desirability of Defensive Sufficiency also provide reasons why renunciation of a pro-nuclear offensive posture should be postponed indefinitely.

In a 1988 essay entitled “Military Doctrine and International Security” (Voennye doktriny imezhdunarodnaia bezopasnosf), General-Major Lebedev and historian Aleksei Podberezkin recited all the usual reasons why a defensive doctrine was required in the contemporary European situation. More interesting, however,, was their belief that a radical revolution in military technologies threatened to make conventional war as devastating as nuclear: The intrusion of the most recent successes of the Scientific-Technological Revolution into the military realm has led in recent years to a revolutionary change in the material foundations of conducting war. This is especially true in recent utilization of the newest advances of micro-electronics and electro-computing techniques. The growth in the military effectiveness of weapons received a powerful push already in the second half of the 1970s. In one decade, the military effectiveness of nuclear systems augmented ten to 15 times, but conventional weapons even more. The new [conventional] systems will become even more effective By its very nature, we now stand on the edge of a new stage of the military-technological revolution, as a result of which the military effectiveness of weapons is able to multiply dozens of times.33

 The application of conventional weapons technology by US forces during Operation Desert Storm would tend to support the Soviets’ conclusions.  To these Soviet analysts, the West had not hesitated to reformulate its own military doctrine to take account of the new potential of conventional war, as the Gulf War later would prove. And although the West paid lip service to the traditional doctrine of flexible response, Soviet analysts charged that NATO in the 1980s in fact had moved to an offensive doctrine foreseeing “a massive application of weapons, including nuclear from the start, aiming at conducting offensive operations with the goal of’ terminating the war on favorable conditions. “Therefore, the question about the possible character of war from the point of view of the USSR and its allies… demands the most careful study both in theory and in practice.”24  An objective observer could understand if the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies decided not to implement the declared defensive posture.

The rapid incorporation of technology throughout NATO merely underscored the Pact’s inferiority in certain aspects of conventional operations and the absence of technology innovations in their forces. It was the moment to state peaceful and defensive intentions accompanied by renewed calls for joint East-West conventional disarmament in an effort to reduce the growing and menacing advantage accruing yearly to NATO forces. In the face of a radical technological revolution in conventional weapons, the more conservative members of the Pact leadership may have insisted that the traditional offensive nuclear plans be retained as a necessary means of neutralizing what was increasingly perceived as a superior enemy. At least such retention would be justified until the negotiating posture of the American administration became more clear.

 And if, in the interim, an opportunity presented itself—if the NATO alliance showed signs of disintegration or the American arms buildup faltered a possibility might emerge for a rapid thrust westward and the unification of Germany by blood and not ballots. So through the summer of 1990, pact forces continued to exercise plans for a nuclear-supported attack to the west. Soviet and Pact leaders remained intent upon at least a temporary retention of plans for an offensive, while East German officials, whose medals cellar was full of decorations, awaited victory ceremonies after the conquest of West Germany.

 In Retrospect Throughout the period of negotiations over German unification, Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinsky was amazed at the hard-line posture adopted by conservative members of the Soviet elite. His predecessor as Ambassador to Bonn had seemed to avoid confronting reality; the sharp criticism of the

Soviet Foreign Ministry continued. At the end of 1990, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze himself resigned, charging that conservative forces were attempting to roll back progressive change.  Kvitsinsky remained involved until the final expression of conservative counterrevolution, the attempted putsch in August 1991, forever changed the face of Russian and Soviet politics.

By the time of the unsuccessful coup, the peaceful unification of Germany had been completed, the Warsaw Pact had disappeared, and the military plans for creating a united communist Germany by force had been relegated to an unfulfilled dream.25 Efforts to devise an offensive strategy for the conquest of West Germany were replaced by attempts to destroy the documents that detailed the Pact’s past intent. Fortunately, these efforts also met with little success. 

It is the task of diplomats such as Ambassador Kvitsinsky to make the effort needed to conclude difficult negotiations successfully, and, having achieved that objective, to then move on to new areas of dispute. And it is the task of historians to ponder the pitfalls and uncertainties which attend even such evident victories as the peaceful German unification.

 What, one wonders, should be made of the durability of Pact plans for an alternative unification, a unification to be accomplished by such repugnant means? Is it possible that a degree of autonomy existed within the Warsaw Pact command structure which permitted it to formulate and exercise offensive doctrine so at odds with the apparent desires of the Soviet political leadership? Perhaps control over the initiation of nuclear attack lay at a lower level of command than heretofore believed, allowing the commanders of the Theaters of Military Action (TVD) to retain the right to act as they saw best, independent of official declaratory policy.

And yet another, perhaps more simple explanation comes to mind. If the revolution in military science and in weaponry made it increasingly unlikely that Pact forces would hold their own in a conventional conflict, what better way to avert such trials than by convincing NATO that nuclear weapons would be employed at the very outbreak of war? In a period of rapid techno-logical change, what better means of protection than to exercise, in full view of Western observers, the most frightening possibilities of an all-out nuclear conflict if war should take place. In short, Pact exercises and plans may have had a healthy component of deception designed to delay the outbreak of conflict until the East Bloc too might master the new advances in warfare.  Such a deception would assuage those officials who were fearful of conflict with the West, yet were willing to support the Gorbachev government in its new policy of détente. As for the more hard-line Pact leaders, if the West were to let down its guard during the ensuing period of military and political change, or if massive domestic turmoil attended German unification, an alternative plan remained close at hand.

 Annual renewal of plans to unify Germany by force permitted Pact military and political leaders, increasingly polarized by the demands of  Gorbachev’s “New Thinking,” to function in harmony during a difficult and uncertain period of domestic transition. Formerly the heart of Pact doctrine, the offensive remained a perfect compromise position even as the Berlin Wall fell.  And if the August 1991 coup in Moscow had come a bit sooner, and hadbeen more successful, this apparent compromise might well have becomeonce again the preferred solution.

 NOTES:

 1. Julij A. Kwizinskij, “Von deutschen Torschuetzen und sowjetischen Querpaessen,” Frankfurier

Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 March 1993, p. 12.

2. Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York:

The Free Press, 1991), p. 131.

3. Kwizinskij, p. 12.

.4. Mititaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: Pressekonferenz von Verteidigungsmin-

ister Stoltenberg am 13 January 1992 (Bonn: Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, February 1992), p. 2.

5. Interview with General P. S. Grachev, Russian Minister of Defense, hvestiia, 2 June 1992, p. 2.

Emphasis added.

6. Descriptions of the Pact plans are contained in Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in

Zentraleurope; Lothar Ruehl, “Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact,” Survival, 23 (September-October

1991), 442-50; Lothar Ruehl, “Die ‘Vorwaertsverteidigung’ der NVA and der sowjetischen Streitkraefte in

Deutschland bis 1990,” Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift, 29 (January-February 1991), 501-08; and

Colone! EMG Fritz Stoeckli, “L’heure de verite,” Revue Militaire Suisse, 337 (October 1992), 543.

7. Heinz Schulte, “Germany: The Aim of Military Intelligence,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 3 (June

1991), p. 280.

8. Ruehl, “Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact,” p. 446.

9. Otto Wenzel, “So sollte in West-Berlin einmarschiert werden,” Berliner Morgenpost, 18 April 1993,

p. 93.

10. Ruehl, “Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact,” p. 446.

11. Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa, p. 5.

12. Stoeckli, pp. 1142.

33. The best source for occupation plans for West Berlin is Wenzel, p. 93.

14. ibid.

15. Militaerische Planungen des warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa, p. 4.

16. Ibid., p. 5.

17. Quoted in Julian Isherwood, “Warsaw Pact Planned to Nuke its Way Across Europe,” Armed Forces

Journal International, June 1993, p. 15.

18. Ruehl, “Offensive Defense in the Warsaw Pact,” p. 448.

19. Quoted in lu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, “Voennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaiá bezopastnost’,”

Kommunist, 13 (September 1988), p. 112. See also “O voennoi doktrine gosudarstv-uchastniko varshavskogo

dogovora,” Pravda, 20 May 1987.

20. A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov, “Protivostoianie si! obshchego naznacheniia v kontekste obespecheniia

strategicheskoi stabil’nosti,” Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia (No. 6,1988), 23. Emphasis

added.

21. Iu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, pp. 117-18. Emphasis added.

22.1 well remember a talk before members of the Atlantic Council in the summer of 1988 at which the

NATO Commander, Genera! Galvin, noted that the only evident change in Pact tactics was a slight “defensive”

delay before they began their grinding offensive into West Germany.

23. Iu. Lebedev and A. Podberezkin, p. 113. Emphasis added.

24. ibid., p. 113. Emphasis added.

25. Kwizinskij, p. 12,

Anne Burford: The Left’s First Victim in the Era of Green McCarthyism

The late Anne Burford was an attorney and former Colorado legislator who also served in the Reagan administration as the first female Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  When first appointed by President Reagan and unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate in 1981, the EPA was the most out of control bureaucracy in the federal government.  Plants, factories and farms across the United States were closed or mired in costly litigation, fines and complaints by this agency’s career bureaucrats and their hard-line leftist green agenda.  For many employers, the EPA seemed more a tool akin to Thor’s Hammer, designed to strike down on capitalism than an agency genuinely interested in environmental protection. 

Taking her direction from President Reagan, Burford based her administration of the EPA on the downsizing of the agency and delegating some EPA functions and services to the individual States. She commissioned an internal review of the agency which uncovered what many had long suspected: That the EPA was over-regulating business and that the agency was too large and not cost-effective. During her 22 months as agency head, she cut the budget of the EPA by 22%, saving the taxpayers countless millions of dollars. She enacted new practices and guidelines which eliminated the thousands of frivolous actions that the agency was bringing and focused on the number of cases filed against real polluters and corporate law breakers. She also replaced most of the ideologically driven career managers with those who had real hands on experience in the market place.

In less than two years, Ms. Burford had transformed the EPA from a bloated, wasteful and politically driven institution to one of the most efficent agencies in the Federal Government. 

Prior to her government service, Ms. Burford, who was a former Fulbright Scholar,  had a broad range of legal experience, being first employed as an attorney with a bank trust department, then as the deputy district attorney in Denver, Colorado, and finally as a corporate attorney for Mountain Bell] Between 1976 and 1980 Ms. Burford served in the Colorado House of Representatives where she was voted as the “Outstanding Freshman Legislator.” 

While being praised by leaders in and outside of government for her skills as an administrator, Ms. Burford also became the target of a partisan and leftist smear campaign. The attacks represented a carefully coordinated campaign orchestrated by liberal members of congress, leaders of leftist groups and the liberal press.

In 1982, the Democratic controlled Congress, in a politically calculated and coordinated attack brought unabashedly contrived charges that the EPA had mishandled a $1.6 billion toxic waste Superfund which far exceeded any demonstrated need and for which some of was returned to the U.S. Treasury. In a politically motivated media campaign, Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives demanded records from Ms. Burford which she refused as they violated the Separation of Powers clause of the U.S. Constitution. She did so with the full blessing and support of President Reagan. 

After a media feeding frenzy, the EPA turned the documents over to Congress several months later, after the White House abandoned its court claim that the documents could not be subpoenaed by Congress because they were covered by executive privilege. Soon after, Ms. Burford resigned her post, citing pressures caused by the media and the congressional investigation.  Burford was again called on by President Reagan in 1984 when he appointed her to a three year term as chair of the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere.

Today farmers are put in jail for daring to plow over areas of their own land which are alleged to be a habitat for some endangered subspecies of rat. Some are rotting in prison over the filling in swamps on property which they have bought and paid for. Entire communities in the Northwest, which had relied on the timber industry for their citizen’s economic well-being, lay near deserted today – like modern ghost towns- because of the mistaken belief that a White Spotted Owl can only survive in “old growth forests.” This while “green” anti-capitalist policies justified in the name of the fictitious “man made global warming “scare have a virtual stranglehold on our economy.

Yet, for two brief years, someone had control of the EPA and held it accountable.  For her incredible efforts and contributions she was victimized by a massive campaign of character assassination by the same people who coined the term “McCarthyism.” Yes, Anne Burford was the first victim of the era of “Green McCarthyism. “  

 

Mr. Clay Shaw: Defamed, Humiliated and Dispossessed of his Life’s Savings by a Mentally Imbalanced Liberal Prosecutor

Clay ShawClay L. Shaw is widely known, thanks to Oliver Stone, as someone who was complicit in the assassination of President Kennedy. In Stone’s movie, JFK, Shaw was played, by renowned actor Tommy Lee Jones, as an effeminate, fastidious, limp-wristed gay man who enjoyed homosexual orgies while watching films of the Hitler Youth engaged in exercise, as well as one of the architects of the 1963 JFK assassination.

Yet, the real Clay Shaw was nothing like the man portrayed in Stone’s film. Far from enjoying anything about NAZIs, the real Clay Shaw was a progressive liberal who supported President Kennedy’s election as well as a World War II veteran who fought against Nazism in Europe and who was decorated by three different countries: The United States with the Legion of Merit and Bronze Star, by France with the Croix de Guerre and named Chevalier de l’Ordre du Merite, and by Belgium named Chevalier of the Order of the Crown of Belgium.

Shaw was a man’s man with an athletic and powerful build. While no credible evidence was presented of Mr. Shaw’s alleged homosexuality – he repeatedly denied being gay – one could hardly fault a prominent businessman, in 1960’s Louisiana, for not acknowledging it – if in fact he was. In the end, Mr. Shaw’s sexual orientation is not germane to the underlying issues concerning the miscarriage of justice visited upon him by New Orleans DA Garrison.

Clay Shaw was the only person ever tried for the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Most, however, do not know that he was also a highly decorated war hero, a prominent New Orleans businessman, a French Quarter preservationists, a valued civic leader, and, from the age of sixteen, a successful playwright. Some of his plays are still produced to this day.

Born on March 17, 1913 into a respected family in the small Louisiana town of Kentwood, Clay Laverne Shaw was named for his grandfather, Thomas Clay Shaw, Kentwood’s Town Marshal. When he was five, he and his family moved to New Orleans.
At Warren Easton High School, Shaw’s one-act play “Submerged,” which he wrote with a classmate, won a state playwriting contest. After graduation from high school, Shaw moved to New York where he managed a Western Union office, while attending Columbia University, and later, was a booking manager for a lecture bureau, representing luminaries such as poet John Masefield, actor Maurice Evans, and first lady Eleanor Roosevelt. Mr. Shaw, a life-long progressive and enthusiastic supporter of “The New Deal,” was particularly fond of Mrs. Roosevelt and her late husband, President Franklin Roosevelt.
When World War II began, Shaw enlisted as a private in the U.S. Army Medical Corps. Soon commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant, he was appointed to the staff of Brigadier General Charles O. Thrasher, directing supplies for the million men who crossed the English Channel in the D-Day invasion.

In a world still recovering from the horrors of war, Shaw saw international trade as more than just a matter of economics. He told a local newspaper, “People who are doing business with each other don’t often get into a fight. Nobody shoots a good customer, and countries that have friendly relations aren’t going to start a war.” While serving as Managing Director of the International Trade Mart, Shaw also became an urban preservationists, renovating French Quarter buildings.

All of these activities left little time for his first love, writing. In 1965, Shaw decided to retire from his position as the Director of the New Orleans Trade Mart. At his retirement, the City of New Orleans awarded him its highest honor, the International Order of Merit, in appreciation of his many contributions to the city. But, the social and political turbulence of the 1960s made a quiet retirement for the aspiring writer impossible.

President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas nearly three years prior to Clay Shaw’s retirement. President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a blue-ribbon committee to investigate the assassination and to report its findings to the American people. Headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, it became known as the “Warren Commission.” The Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin, but a large portion of the population felt that they had not presented the whole story.

New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was one such skeptic. Garrison was Liberal, ruthless, and politically ambitious, he saw in the Kennedy assassination his opportunity for fame. He announced that the Warren Commission had deliberately lied to the American people, purposefully covering up a conspiracy. Reveling in the international attention he received, Garrison proposed, variously, that the conspiracy was hatched by the C. I. A., the F. B. I., the military-industrial complex, Cuban Communists, and Lyndon Johnson with the help of his Texas oil baron friends.
But Garrison needed a theory that allowed him jurisdiction to prosecute, so he came up with the idea that the conspiracy was planned in New Orleans, and the assassination was a “homosexual thrill killing.” He told a journalist, “They had the same motive as Loeb and Leopold when they murdered Bobbie Franks in Chicago.”

On March 1, 1967, Jim Garrison arrested Clay Shaw and charged him with conspiring to assassinate President Kennedy. Garrison suspected Shaw was gay, but the general public did not. Shaw would soon forever be known to the world, rightly or wrongly, as a “homosexual.”

A pillar of the New Orleans’s Community, Shaw was soon being falsely described by Garrison and his office a as a sadistic and perverse man who patronized gay prostitutes. Many of New Orleans’s civic leaders protested the false charges as nothing more than a witch hunt.

While the prosecutor had an entire staff and large budget devoted to the prosecution, Mr. Shaw was force to spend most of his life’s savings in defending against the charges.

At trial, it soon became evident that Mr. Garrison really had no case despite having assured the swarm of media organizations covering the affair that he had more than sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Shaw.
Prior to trial, national news outlets, including NBC, The New York times and the Washington Post, began covering stories concerning documented instances of misconduct by District Attorney Garrison’s office. These included, among others, bribery, intimidation and suborning perjury in an effort to coerce people into testifying against Clay Shaw.
Some of the reporting included taped and televised interviews with witnesses Garrison’s office attempted to extort into giving false testimony against Shaw.

EXAMPLE ONE:

INTERVIEW OF JOHN CANCLER BY NBC NEWS

Q. What is your profession, Mr. Cancler?
A. You mean, what was my profession?
Q. Yes.
A. I was a burglar.
Q. You were in Parish Prison on this burglary rap.
A. Right.
Q. And did you meet a man named Vernon Bundy there?
A. I found out later his name was Vernon Bundy. See, I didn’t know what his name was until I read the paper. I only knew him as “Legs.”
Q. What did “Legs” tell you up there?
A. He just said, “I wonder whether I should say I saw him on Esplanade or I saw him on the lakefront.” I said, “Man, it’s getting bad if you start talking to yourself, too.” You know, like some of these guys will stir bug, you know. He said, “No, man.” He said, “I’m talking about this cat, Shaw.” I said, “What you talking about, man?” He said, “Man, I don’t know whether it’s best for me to say I saw him on Esplanade Street or the lakefront.”
Q. Did Bundy indicate to you whether the story that he was going to tell in court was true?
A. Did he [indicate]? How could he indicate when he would ask me, should he say this or should he say that? If it was the truth, he would know what to say.
Q. It was obvious from what he told you that he was going to tell a lie then?
A. He told a lie.
Q. Did he tell you it was a lie?
A. Sure. I asked him, “Man, is this the truth?” He said, no. He said, “No, it’s not the truth.”(2)

EXAMPLE TWO:

INTERVIEW WITH MIGUEL TORRES BY NBC NEWS

Torres was also incarcerated with Garrision’s important witness, Vernon Bundy.

Q. What did he [Garrision witness Vernon Bundy] tell you about his testimony that day?
A. He says, “Well, that’s the only way that I can get cut loose.” I asked him, how much time did he owe that state. He said he owed the state five years; he was out on five years’ probation. And then I said, “Well, that’s a hell of a thing to be doing in order to do what you want to do.” He says, “Well, the reason I am doing this is, it’s the only way I can get cut loose.”
Q. In other words, he said to you, in effect, that he was testifying as he was in the Shaw hearing in order to prevent his probation from being revoked, is that right?
A. From being violated, yes, sir.
Q. Did you get the impression that he knew that his testimony in the hearing had been false?
A. Well, just exactly how I said. He said, “The reason I am doing this is because it’s the only way I can get cut loose.” And the impression I got was that: that it was [an] out-front lie.(3)

EXAMPLE THREE

INTERVIEW WITH MIGUEL TORRES BY NBC NEWS

A. A few months back they called me out to the control center at Angola, and there was two district attorney investigators who came to me with some pictures in a briefcase.
Q. Who were they?
A. One of them was Lynn Loisel, and I forgot the other one’s name.
Q. Louis Ivon?
A. Yes, sir, I believe that’s the name. Well, Mr. Loisel, the way he opened up the conversation, he asked me what was the thing that I wanted the most. I told him, needless to say, my freedom. So he said, I could either be cut loose right away, or I could be made to serve this whole nine-year sentence. The way he said it, the District Attorney, Mr. Garrison, could cut me loose completely. He would say he was a very powerful man, that he could hurt many people, or he could also help them. All depend [sic] on how they cooperated with him.
Q. Now, what happened to you after you came back here to the Parish Prison?
A. Well, he started asking me — You see, I lived in the 1300 block of Chartres, way back when I first came to the states. And then I lived in [the] 900 block of Esplanade, which puts me in a good position around Mr. Clay’s house. And he wanted me to say I had been approached by Mr. Shaw in couple occasions [sic], see. And I refused to say that. I told him, I can’t say that.
Q. Approached in what way?
A. Homosexual approach. And he wanted me to say that Mr. Clay Shaw was Clem Bertrand.
Q. Had you ever been approached by anyone meeting that description?
A. No, sir. I have never been approached by anyone like that.

As one might suspect, Mr. Shaw was acquitted at trial where his bewildered jurors, who deliberated less than an hour before rendering a verdict, expressed shock that such a case was even brought to begin with.
Mr. Shaw, who had planned on an early retirement around the time he was charged, ended up having to return to work in order to support himself. He died some five years later as a recluse. The toll of the case against him and the smearing of his name throughout the international press had taken a severe toll on the former war hero. As for Mr. Garrison, the voters drove him from office by an overwhelming majority when he attempted reelection in large part due to the bogus case brought against Mr. Shaw.
Unfortunately for Mr. Shaw, it is impossible to unerring a bell and he spent the remainder of his life tarnished by the event.

America’s Greatest General

Relatively small in numbers are those of us who remember one of our nation’s greatest military heroes, former Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay.   Yet, only a generation ago, his outsized personality and larger than life portfolio of accomplishments made him a beloved and trusted figure to most Americans.  No more a telling testament to his character and leadership abilities were there ever than the near universal love of and devotion to LeMay displayed by those who were fortunate enough to have served under him.  Yet, today, one need only “Google” General LeMay’s name to witness the endless pages of virulent attacks against his character  and achievements where he is accused of everything from taking part in the assassination of President Kennedy to being a racist war monger, frothing over at the mouth to incinerate  all of humanity in a Nuclear inferno.

 General LeMay beckons our collective memory back to a time when America’s Military leaders were warriors and forceful guardians of our national security who suffered fools poorly and had little patience for those civilian officials who would try to compromise our national defense in the name of political horse trading or expedience. LeMay and his contemporaries during those crucial and uncertain years of the Cold War stand in stark contrast to some of today’s meek mannered, politically correct Generals who seem more interested in future admission into the Council on Foreign Relations than risking controversy by aggressively standing up for our national security. Could anyone honestly say that if Generals like Curtis LeMay, Lyman Lemnitzer, George Patton, or Thomas Power were giving a free hand at running the War on Global Terrorism we would be losing or at least void of any measurable results?

 Curtis LeMay was born and raised in Ohio, one of ten children, under extreme poverty.  Hunger was the daily norm for him and his nine siblings. Overcoming many obstacles, he went on to work his way through Ohio State University graduating with a degree in civil engineering. A stellar member of the university’s R.O.T.C. program, LeMay went on to a career in the then fledgling U.S. Army Air Corps in 1930.

 Young Lieutenant LeMay proved a natural, both as a stellar pilot and as a student of aerial navigation.  At a time when the Air Corps was considered an overpriced novelty by America’s military leaders, LeMay recognized the overwhelming potential of aircraft as the seminal force in future wars.  As navigator on a B-17 bomber, he located an American battleship in exercises off the coast of California, after which LeMay’s aircraft successfully attacked it with water bombs, despite being given the wrong coordinates by Navy personnel. In May 1938 he navigated a group of B-17 Bombers over 610 miles across the Atlantic Ocean to intercept the Italian liner Rex thus illustrating the ability of U.S. airpower to defend the nation’s coasts.

 Upon the entry of the United States into World War II, LeMay was rapidly advanced in rank. Initially commanding the 305th Bomber Group, LeMay became instrumental in developing U.S. tactics and strategy in the European Air campaigns. He is credited with inventing the “Box Formation” for B-17 Bombers.  Bombing missions at the time were the most dangerous in the war.  Over half of the B-17 air crews would be lost during the early years of the war. Although not expected of bomber wing commanders, LeMay would often personally lead his formations during bombing operations taking the position of lead aircraft which was far and away the most dangerous position to fly in the formation. Typical of these missions was the attack on the Regensburg section of the Schweinfurt-Regensburg area of Germany during August of 1943. In that mission LeMay personal  led a formation of 146 B-17 bombers beyond the range of escorting fighters into Regensburg, Germany, and after bombing, continued on to bases in North Africa, losing 24 bombers in the process.

 At the onset of the Cold War, America found itself in the position of needing a credible nuclear deterrent. The Triad doctrine consisting of a strategic nuclear deployment configuration of bomber, submarine   and missile (ICBM) based delivery platforms was the virtual creation of General LeMay.  LeMay also conceived and oversaw development of what would become the Strategic Air Command (SAC).  The institutions, doctrines and policies proved an insurmountable defense to any adversary hoping to achieve a nuclear knockout blow via a surprise attack on U.S. strategic assets.  Perhaps more importantly, this brainchild of General LeMay prevented any subsequent wars of the scale of WWI and WWII.  Such large scale conventional conflicts between world powers became far too risky in the LeMay nuclear age.  Curtis LeMay was the father of the Peace through Strength school of thought and indeed, coined the “Peace is Our Profession” mission statement frequently displayed on SAC bases throughout the Cold War.

 Yet, despite the years of service to his country and immeasurable contributions to our national security, which were realized for decades after his retirement from active service, his vilification became a cause célèbre for the radical left in America.  While beloved by the vast majority of Americans for his role as the preeminent defender of our national security, it was these same traits that caused him to be despised by the American hating left of the era.  He was often portrayed by American radicals as a warmonger, frothing at the mouth to initiate a global holocaust.  Very odd when one considers that it was LeMay alone, during his time commanding SAC, who had at his disposable the launch codes and orders needed to launch a nuclear strike independent from an order given by the U.S. President. This, so as to ensure that any surprise attack against the national command structure in Washington, would not leave the country unable to launch a coordinated counter-attack.

 For most of us who remember him, his true legacy will always be secure.

 

Evan Mecham: Ruined by Liberal McCarthyism

Evan Mecham: War Hero, Self-made Millionaire and Governor of Arizona

Evan Mecham (May 12, 1924 – February 21, 2008) was perhaps our nation’s last true ideologically conservative governor. A decorated hero of the Second World War, Mecham, who grew up in relative poverty, went on to become a self-made millionaire businessman. Known as a “cracker jack” pilot during the war, Mecham flew the famous P-51 Mustang fighter in numerous combat missions over Western Europe. He was also one of the first fighter pilots in history to engage in aerial combat or “dogfight,” with a jet aircraft.

On March 7, 1945, while flying on a fighter escort mission over Germany, Mecham encountered a Messerschmitt (Me) 262 – German jet aircraft. In order to protect the lives of American Airmen flying in a photo reconnaissance plane, Mecham courageously attacked the German fighter Jet in his prop driven P-51. Lieutenant Mecham engaged the enemy bogey with his six .50 caliber machine guns located on his aircraft’s wings. After a heroic battle, which drew the German aircraft away from the plane he was charged with protecting, the far faster and more maneuverable German jet was able to position itself in a blind spot under Mecham’s Mustang and opened fire. In an instant, Mecham’s P-51 was transformed into hurling wreckage, spinning violently toward earth. Despite the multiple G-Forces virtually pinning him inside the cockpit, Mecham was able to wrest himself free from his doomed airplane and deploy his parachute.

Making a hard landing on German soil, the young American Air Corps officer shattered a knee and was thus unable to escape or evade German security forces. He was taken to a prisoner of war camp inside Germany where he remained until the final days of the war in Europe. It was during his time as a POW that Mecham began to understand the true importance of leadership. It was clear to him that it was not soldiers who started wars but rather, political leaders. For his heroism, Mecham was awarded the Air Medal and the Purple Heart. Mecham was discharged from active service and returned home in early 1946 as a legitimate war hero.

He soon married his high school sweetheart and returned to college at Arizona State University. After college, Mecham purchased a Glendale Pontiac dealership primarily with the money he had saved both during and after the war. Mecham proved to have a knack for business and soon he would own several car dealerships in a number of states. A self-made millionaire by the time he was thirty-years-old, Mecham’s financial empire would eventually include a sizable interest in a mining company as well as other lucrative ventures.

It would have been quite easy for Mr. Mecham to coast through the remainder of his life on the fortune he had made during his early adulthood. Had he done so, he would have undoubtedly been recognized as a self-made man who epitomized the American dream. He would have been remembered as the unassuming war hero turned community booster who taught Sunday school at his church and who supported many charitable works. Perhaps most of all, he would have been remembered as a superb father to his seven children and many grandchildren as well as a stellar husband and patriarch of a very functional family.
Yet, Mecham died in 2008 a broken man in financial ruin with his reputation destroyed. Why? Mecham, who sought more than mere financial success, apparently had the unmitigated gall to seek public office in defiance of and opposition to a small cabal of behind the scenes power brokers who owned the primary industries and major media outlets in the State of Arizona.

In the late 1950’s, Mecham, like many other Arizona businessmen and politicians, was aware of a small group of elite located in the City of Phoenix who virtually controlled the political and economic scene in Arizona which was then a small, sparsely populated state. Many complained about this group, which later would become known as the “Phoenix 40,” for their iron clad grip on the state through generous financial support and favorable media puff for those politicians whom they handpicked. In return, the Phoenix 40 received a free run of the state including the ability to develop large areas of land and harvest the state’s considerable resources with little or no regulation. Members of the Phoenix 40 also included the state’s most prominent bankers.

At all levels, the relationships were interwoven. The business interests in this elite group supported the group’s media owning members through their advertising dollars. The media members wrote favorable pieces about the group’s business interests as well as those handpicked politicians who were supported by the 40. The Phoenix 40’s politicians passed legislation favorable to their benefactors in the 40 and ran interference against bureaucratic meddling in the 40’s business activities. For the Phoenix 40, the arrangement was tantamount to a government mandate to print their own money. To unscrupulous politicians, it was a one of a kind blessing: near unlimited money and glowing press coverage in furtherance of their electoral ambitions. Those who dared to oppose the Phoenix 40 were destroyed.

Even Mecham believed, as did many others, that the influence, if not outright control, of the state by such a small group was wrong and dangerous to the democratic process. In 1960 he was elected to the Arizona State Senate and started an independent newspaper. A fighter from the beginning, Mecham took on the powerful special interest that had turned Arizona into their own general store. For his efforts, he was lambasted by the Phoenix 40’s media outlets and discredited throughout the state’s power elites.

Despite this organized campaign of character assassination, Evan Mecham was elected Governor, after several unsuccessful attempts in 1986 on a platform of returning control of the state to the people. The newly elected governor went after the Phoenix 40 and their supporters with all the vigor and leverage his new office could muster.

They day after his election, the powerful, behind the scenes elite and Phoenix 40 controlled media went after the newly elected Governor with a vengeance and a recall campaign was started before he was even sworn in. For his part Mecham, who was not a seasoned politician, spoke from his heart and committed a number of gaffes that were further magnified and distorted by a hostile media. He was also often misquoted by the press.

After only a couple of months into his term, Mecham were being investigated by the 40’s State Attorney General on some alleged and completely trumped up charges of financial misconduct. He was later charged with three different criminal offenses that were so outrageously fabricated, they are not even worthy of further description other than to note he was easily acquitted in a court of law of all charges which came as no surprise to those in the legal community. Although ultimately being exonerated by the trial court of all wrongdoing, Mecham found himself fighting a recall campaigned handsomely funded by the deep pockets of the 40 as well as impeachment proceedings prosecuted by 40 politicians which were the same as those he was eventually acquitted of But rather than let the Arizona voters and the courts have their say, the legislature removed him from office.

He was the only Governor in U.S. history to be attacked on so many fronts.After more than twenty years, compelling evidence now shows that his 1988 impeachment was orchestrated by a powerful behind-the-scenes group lead by the Phoenix 40 and was based on purely political motives. Threatened by Mecham’s pledge to take political power out of the hands of special interests and return to government on behalf of the people, the powerbrokers hatched an ingenious plot to get rid of him. Fifteen months into his four-year term, despite the fact that Mecham had not broken a single civil or criminal law, they succeeded.


Mecham died in 2008 in a veteran’s home in a pronounced state of failed health undoubtedly brought on by the overwhelming stress and anxiety of fighting the character assassination visited upon him. Most of his fortune had dissipated fighting the various make-believe charges brought against him and in defending his reputation.



The character assassination of Governor Mecham demonstrates what many today in America now realize: that the intricate processes of government can and is often easily manipulated by the elites. Thus, the moral to the Mecham story is that a handful of elites and special interests can veto the decisions of the voting public. Does this sound familiar?